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J. iNTELL PROP. L[o
Thanks to the intemet, litigation over copyright infringement can occur
between residents of different continents almost as easily as between residents of
different states. To be sure, despite many similarities in the copyright laws of
countries that are members of the Berne Convention, conflicts of laws issues can
and do arise from such international disputes. For example, a court sitting in
France, recently applied United States fair use law to dismiss a claim of copyright
infringement of French works, a result that might not have been the same had
French law been applied.'
But what about moral rights-rights that, although entirely independent of
copyright, are in many cases implicated by the same operative facts that give rise
to a claim of copyright infringement? The moral rights laws of the United States,
on one hand, and of many European countries, on the other, are far less similar
than the copyright laws applied in those countries. Notwithstanding a European
court's decision to apply U.S. copyright law in a particular case, will the same
court, on public policy grounds, apply its own law to moral rights claims arising
from the same facts? And if so, will that European court's moral rights judgment
later be deemed unenforceable in the United States, where vindicating such rights
could conflict with foundational public policy by altering the traditional contours
of copyright protection in a manner that would chill speech and violate the First
Amendment? It is this conflict that the authors seek to explore.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works
of 1886 (the Berne Convention)' requires that the copyright laws of the treaty
signatories reflect certain common rights and privileges, with the result that
copyright is one of the more internationally uniform bodies of law.3 Nevertheless,
as between the Unites States and Europe, there are significant differences in two
important doctrines: fair use and moral rights. These differences become of more
1 See Socit6 des Auteurs des Arts Visuels et de l'Image Fixe (SAIF) v. SARL Google
France, Tribunal de grande instance [T.G.I.] [ordinary court of original jurisdiction] Paris 3e ch.,
May 20,2008, available athttp://www.foruminternet.org/specialistes/veille-jurisdique/jurispruden
ce/ttibunal-de-grande-instance-de-paris-3e-chambre-re-section-20-mai-2008-2672.htmIl (noting that
the situs of the alleged infringement-the location of the servers and the headquarters where
relevant company decisions were made-was on U.S. soil). The authors are helping defend Google
in related and parallel cases in France and the United States involving the scanning of books.
2 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, 828
U.N.T.S. 221, S. TREATY Doc. No. 99-27 (1989) (codified in various sections of 17. U.S.C. § 106A).
' If Giliam v. American Br asting Co., 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976) is no longer good law,
however, as discussed infra, questions arise as to the true extent of the United States' adherence to
these Berne requirements.
[Vol. 17:5
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than an academic interest when a work protected by strict moral rights laws in one
country (for example, France or Belgium) is used in a manner that implicates
comparatively liberal fair use rights in another country (for example, the United
States). This is especially true given the importance of fair use in mediating the
tension between copyright protection and free expression under the First
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, and the increase of international
information exchange brought about by the internet.
This conflict was addressed in part in a handful of well-known cases in the
mid-to-late Twentieth Century involving disputes over internationally distributed
films.4 More recently, the issue has surfaced in European lawsuits involving
various web applications developed by United States-based Google. Two of these
lawsuits, Socidtd des Auteurs des Arts Visuels et de l7mage Fixe (SAIF) v. SARL Google
France and Google v. Copiepresse,6 in which the authors assisted Google in preparing
See, e.g., Turner Entm't Co. v. Huston, Cour d'appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Versailles,
civ. ch., Dec- 1994, translated in 16 No. 10 ENT. L. REP. 3 (1995) (involving the colorization
and broadcast of "Asphalt Jungle'); Shostakovich v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 80
N.Y.S.2d 575 (Sup. Ct. 1948). The Shostakovich case was brought by several famous Soviet
composers who objected to the use of their public-domain music and their names in the credit lines,
in a motion picture the plaintiffs viewed as anti-Soviet. While the New York court noted that
"[c]onceivably, under the doctrine of moral right the court could in a proper case, prevent the use
of a composition or work, in the public domain, in such a manner as would be violative of the
author's rights," it recognized the implicated "conflict between the moral right and the well-
established rights of others to use such works [n the public domain]" and, more importandy, the
fact that "[i]n the present state of our law the very existence of the right is not clear ...." Id. In
France, however, the plaintiffs were able to obtain an injunction. See Soc. Le Chant de Monde v.
Soc. Fox Europe et Soc. Fox Am~ricaine Twentieth Century, Cour d'appel [CA] [regional court of
appeal] Paris, Jan. 13, 1953, D. Jut. 16, 80 (noting that Twentieth Century-Fox violated the
composers' rights). In Huston, John Huston's heirs brought suit against Turner Entertainment Co.
to enjoin the airing in France of Turner's colorized version of Huston's black and white film
"Asphalt Jungle." CA Versailles, civ. ch., Dec. 1994. An intermediate French court denied the
injunction, holding that U.S. law governed Huston's studio contracts, and under U.S. copyright law,
Huston was not the author of the work-for-hire film. The high French court reversed, however,
holding that artists' moral rights were "laws of mandatory application" regardless of the national
origin of the works or the claimants. The court held that under French law, Huston was an
"author" and his moral rights were not waiveable by contract and persisted beyond his death to be
inherited by the plaintiffs. Upon determining that the colorization in fact violated Huston's right
of integrity in the film, the court issued an injunction against broadcasting it in France. Id
5 SAIF, T.G.I. Paris 3e ch., May 20,2008. In SAIF, the French court found that U.S. copyright
law applied to SAIF's copyright infringement claims under Article 5 of the Berne Convention
because the United States was the territory where the wrongdoing occurred (Google's registered
office is located in California, which is also where Google's decisions and the activity of its search
engines occurred). Conducting an analysis under 17 U.S.C. § 107, the French court found that
Google's display of thumbnail images of the complainants' works in its Google Images application
constituted a fair use under U.S. law.
6 Google v. Copiepresse, No. 06/10.928/C Tribunal de premiere instance de Bruxelles,
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testimony, squarely addressed the application of this U.S. fair use principle in
France and Belgium, respectively, and in the latter, created the opportunity for a
hypothetical analysis of the application of U.S. law to the Belgian plaintiffs' moral
rights claims. In Copiepresse, the Plaintiff, a Belgian newspaper association, claimed
that Google's display of headlines and short excerpt "snippets" of news stories
published on the internet without including the names of the individual authors
of the articles on the Google News page constituted a violation of the authors'
moral rights of integrity and attribution.' The authors' analysis in that case
supports the position that these moral rights claims would be dismissed in a U.S.
court because they would be found to be preempted by U.S. copyright law and by
operation of the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution, or in violation of the
First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. This analysis is significant because
even though European courts may not actually apply U.S. substantive law when
deciding moral rights claims, a finding that any resulting foreign judgment would
violate the U.S. Constitution would affect the plaintiffs' ability to enforce the
judgment in the United States.!
II. MORAL RIGHTS
A. MORAL RIGHTS OVERVIEW
"Moral rights," also referred to as "le droit moral," are a bundle of rights
created for the purpose of protecting an author's reputation. These rights are
personal to the artist and are entirely separate from the real property or copyright
rights associated with a particular work; the artist retains them even after the work
is sold, the copyright in the work is sold or licensed, or the work falls into the
public domain.9 Moral rights include the right of disclosure, or first publication;
Feb. 13, 2007, available at http://www.copiepresse.be/13-02-07-jugement-en.pdf.
7 Id.
8 See, e.g., Joseph M. Beck, The Loss of Rights After Dastar, MANAGING INTELL. PROP.,
Oct. 2005, at 1; Joseph M. Beck, Alex S. Fonoroff & Robin Wharton, Moral Rights, Legal Wrongs,
COPYRIGHT WORLD, Sept. 2003, at 17. One commentator differs, arguing that "a French (or, for
that matter, any foreign) judgment based on droit moral should not encounter public-policy or
constitutional obstacles to enforcement in the United States." Alexander Gigante, Ice Patch on the
Information Superhighway: Foreign I 'abihy for Domestically Created Content, 14 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT.
L.J. 523, 535 (1996).
9 See Berne Convention, supra note 2, art. 6bis, 17 U.S.C. § 106A; 3 MELVILLE B. NIMVER &
DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, at Ch. 8D (Matthew Bender, rev. ed.); see also Kathryn
A. Kelly, Moral Rights and the FirstAmendment: Putting Honor Before Free Speech?, 11 U. MIAM ENT. &
SPORTS L. REV. 211, 215-16 (1994); Timothy E. Nielander, Reflections on a Gossamer Thread in the
World Wide Web: Claims for Protection of the Droit Moral Right of Integrity in Digital# Distributed Works of
Authorsbh, 20 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. LJ. 59, 68 (1997).
[Vol. 17:5
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the right of attribution, previously known as paternity; the right of integrity; and
the right of withdrawal or the author's right to withdraw or disavow his work after
it is published." Of these, this Article will focus primarily on the rights of
attribution and integrity.
The right of attribution encompasses the author's right to control recognition
of authorship-basically, to require the author's name to be associated with, or
withdrawn from, a work." The moral right of integrity protects authors from
reputational harm from the intentional truncation, distortion, modification, or
mutilation of their works.
12
B. SUMMARY OF U.S. MORAL RIGHTS LAWS
The Berne Convention requires protection of moral rights-specifically the
right of attribution and the right of integrity-but permits member countries to
provide greater protection as well.' 3 Moral rights protection in the United States
is much more limited than in many European countries, existing primarily in the
federal Visual Artist Rights Act of 1990"4 and some narrowly-drawn state laws.
Any remaining protection required under Berne is supposedly provided in the
United States by its privacy, defamation, unfair competition, and intellectual
property laws.
1. The VisualAriists Ri'ghts Act of 1990. The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990
(VARA) protects certain works of visual art, specifically, certain paintings,
drawings, prints, and sculptures and limited-edition photographs." Importantly,
VARA does not apply to films, literary works, electronic publications, advertising,
works made for hire, or works not under copyright. 6
In addition to being limited to certain types of works of visual art, the federal
rights of attribution and integrity created by VARA are themselves more limited
than similar rights in some civil law countries. For example, while the rights of
attribution and integrity are perpetual in France, Italy, and Spain, and while they
endure for the full period of copyright protection in the United Kingdom,
Australia, and New Zealand, works created on or after the effective date of VARA
10 See 3 NIMM[ER & NIMMER, supra note 9, §§ 8D.03-.05.
1 See id. § 8D.03; see also 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(1) (2006).
12 See 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, sUpra note 9, § 8D.04; see also 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(2)-(3) (2006).
13 See Berne Convention, smpra note 2.
14 See Visual Artist's Rights Act of 1990 (VARA), 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2006) (providing for the
rights of attribution and integrity).
is See id. (applying to authors of"work[s] of visual art"); see aLro 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining "work
of visual art").
16 VARA, 17 U.S.C. § 106A.
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are subject to the federal U.S. rights of attribution and integrity only during the life
of the artist.
17
2. Common Law Moral Rigbts. Other than the limited federal moral rights
created by VARA for certain works of visual art, the only sources of moral rights
protection in the United States are state moral rights laws, to the extent they are
not preempted by federal law, and common law moral rights-type claims that have
been recognized by courts (and possible protection under § 43(a) of the Lanham
Act as discussed infra). While there have been instances where U.S. courts have
recognized or appeared to recognize moral rights-type claims, the current vitality
of such decisions has been called into doubt by subsequent decisions and the
passage of VARA.'8
17 Id. § 106A(d)(1). Works subject to VARA but created before its effective date, the tide to
which has not been transferred, are eligible for moral rights protection under VARA that is
coextensive with the period of copyright protection for such works. Id § 106A(d)(2). The moral
rights created by VARA are also limited by several exceptions, including the notable exception that
they do not apply to
any reproduction, depiction, portrayal, or other use of a work in, upon, or in any
connection with any ["poster, map, globe, chart, technical drawing, diagram,
model, applied art, motion picture or other audiovisual work, book, magazine,
newspaper, periodical, data base, electronic information service, electronic
publication, or similar publication"; or "any merchandising item or advertising,
promotional, descriptive, covering, or packaging material or container"; or any
portion of any such item, or "any work made for hire'].
Id. § 106A(c)(3) (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 101).
18 See, e.g., Stevens v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 148 U.S.P.Q. 755, 758 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1966) (granting,
in a pre-VARA oral opinion, a preliminary injunction preventing the National Broadcasting
Company from cutting and editing plaintiff's film, A Place in the Sun, to insert commercials that
would "alter, adversely affect, or emasculate the artistic or pictorial quality of said motion
picture .. " The court based its decision on the fact that "a photofilm can be an art form," and
that the court can grant relief to protect an art form's "artistic integrity." VARA, of course,
explicitly exempts from protection motion pictures.); c Franconero v. Universal Music Corp., 70
U.S.P.Q.2d 1398 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 18,2003) ("United States law does not recognize moral rights with
respect to vocal performances, and only recognizes moral rights claims as to visual arts that have
been altered or deformed.'); Crimi v. Rutgers Presbyterian Church, 194 Misc. 570, 575 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1949) (responding to plaintiff's reliance on language in the Berne Convention and the concept
of "moral rights" in European cases by stating that "[tihe conception of 'moral tights' of authors,
so fully recognized and developed in the civil law countries has not yet received acceptance in the
law of the United States. No such right is referred to by legislation, court decision or writers."
(quoting Vargas v. Esquire, Inc., 164 F.2d 522, 526 (7th Cir. 1947))). There are also cases that
appear to allude to moral rights in U.S. common law, but which turn on contract law and which,
if any, rights remained with the author as per the sales contract. See, e.g., Preminger v. Columbia
Pictures Corp., 49 Misc. 2d 363 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1966) (establishing, based on contract law principles,
the right of a grantee of television rights to cut and edit a film so long as the custom and usage so
provided, and the artistic merit of the work was not impaired).
[Vol. 17:5
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3. The Right of Integriy: Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Co. In Gilliam v.
American Broadcasting Co., 9 a pre-VARA case, the Second Circuit extended relief
for a moral right of integrity-type claim under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act.' The
plaintiffs in Gilliam, members of the comedy troupe "Monty Python," argued that
defendant ABC's truncation of their "Monty Python's Flying Circus" works to fit
them within the dictates of U.S. commercial television constituted a mutilation of
their works, and that attributing the edited program to plaintiffs as their work
constituted a misrepresentation that harmed their reputations.2
The Second Circuit found that "an allegation that a defendant has presented
to the public a 'garbled,' distorted version of plaintiff's work seeks to redress the
very rights sought to be protected by the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), and
should be recognized as stating a cause of action under that statute."' The court
added that "the edited version broadcast by ABC impaired the integrity of
appellants' work and represented to the public as the product of appellants what
was actually a mere caricature of their talents. We believe that a valid cause of
action for such distortion exists .... "'
Nearly twenty years later, however, and after the passage of VARA, a district
court in the Second Circuit denied that any common law moral rights claim of
integrity emerged from Gilliam. On the contrary, in Choe v. Fordham University
School of Law, the Southern District of New York held:
There is no federal claim for violation of plaintiff's alleged "moral
rights." The Court in Gilliam stated that nearly 20 years ago....
Whatever language there may be in [Community for Creaive Non-
Violence v.] Reidor Gilliam to suggest a federal common law claim for
19 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976).
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2006).
21 Gibam, 538 F.2d at 18.
' Id. at 24-25 (internal citations omitted); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) ("(1) Any person who, on
or in connection with any goods or services, or any container for goods, uses in commerce any
word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, or any false designation of origin,
false or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact, which-(A) is
likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or
association of such person with another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his
or her goods, services, or commercial activities by another person... shall be liable in a civil action
by any person who believes that he or she is likely to be damaged by such act.").
2 Id. at 25. Judge Gurfein, in his concurring opinion, was more skeptical:
If a distortion or truncation in connection with a use constitutes an infringement
of copyright, there is no need for an additional cause of action beyond copyright
infringement.... So far as the Lanham Act is concerned, it is not a substitute
for droit moralwhich authors in Europe enjoy.... [T]he Lanham Act does not
deal with artistic integrity. It only goes to misdescription of origin and the like.
Id at 26-27 (internal citations omitted).
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deprivation of an author's "moral rights" is dictum, and has not
generated any claim in this Circuit for almost 20 years .... Because
the law in this Circuit does not recognize an author's common law
"moral rights" to sue for alleged distortion of his written work,
plaintiff's purported "moral rights" claim is dismissed.24
4. The RightofAtribufion: Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp.
In DastarCorp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., the U.S. Supreme Court held that
recognizing a claim for failure to attribute authorship of a public domain work
under the Lanham Act would render superfluous 17 U.S.C. § 106A's express
limitations on the scope of the federal right of attribution and would create a
perpetual copyright not authorized by the Constitution.5
In Dastar, the defendant copied, edited, and repackaged tapes of a public-
domain television series based on a copyrighted book about World War II. The
tapes and their advertising referred to defendant Dastar Corporation and its
employees as the producers of the tapes and made no mention of the original
book, the plaintiff's television series from which the defendants copied the
footage, or the plaintiff's series' producers. Ruling on the plaintiff's Lanham Act
reverse passing-off claim, the Supreme Court held that the attribution of the
"origin" of the tapes sold by defendant was not a false designation of origin as
prohibited by the Lanham Act, adding that recognizing a Lanham Act claim for
failure to attribute authorship for a public-domain work would "create a species
of mutant copyright law that limits the public's 'federal right to "copy and to
use,"' "26 effectively creating a "species of perpetual .. .copyright, which
Congress may not do" under the U.S. Constitution.27
While the Dastar decision itself involved a public domain work, courts have
since applied the Supreme Court's reasoning in that case to dismiss moral rights-
style attribution claims involving copyrighted as well as public domain works.'
24 Choe v. Fordham Univ. Sch. of Law, 920 F. Supp. 44, 49 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
z Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 34-35, 37 (2003).
26 Id. at 34.
27 Id at 37.
2" See, e.g., Zyla v. Wadsworth, 360 F.3d 243 (1st Cit. 2004) (affirming summary judgment for
defendant on Lanham Act claim for failure to grant plaintiff co-author credit of a copyrighted
textbook, and citing Dastar for its statement that "[t]he Supreme Court has determined ... that
Section 43(a)(1)(A) does not apply to the type of claim that Zyla raises .... Claims of false
authorship . . . should be pursued under copyright law instead."); Carroll v. Kahn, 68
U.S.P.Q.2d 1357 (N.D.N.Y. 2003) ("A Lanham Act claim based on Defendants' alleged failure to
give Plaintiff proper credit as author and/or producer, however, is foreclosed by Dastar.'); Williams
v. UMG Recording, Inc., 281 F. Supp. 2d 1177 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (holding barred as a matter of law
under Dastar plaintiffs Lanham Act claim based on failure to attribute to plaintiff his contribution
in re-editing and re-scoring a copyrighted film).
[Vol. 17:5
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One district court described the post-Dastarlandscape for attribution claims under
the Lanham Act as follows:
Dastarmakes clear that a claim that a defendant's failure to credit the
plaintiff on the defendant's goods is actionable only where the
defendant literally repackages the plaintiff's goods and sells them as
the defendant's own-not where, as here, Defendants are accused
only of failing to identify someone who contributed not goods, but
ideas or communications (or, for that matter, 'services) to
Defendants' product.'
The Lanham Act attribution claim that survives Dastar, then, would appear to be
a very narrow claim for false attribution.
III. U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW, THE FIRST AMENDMENT, AND INTERNATIONAL
TREATY OBLIGATIONS
The primacy of First Amendment values in American jurisprudence has been
illustrated in a long line of cases upholding freedom of expression against laws that
would chill or create prior restraints on speech.' The coexistence of copyright
law-which restrains infringing speech, yet is also authorized by the
Constitution-and the First Amendment's free speech protections depends on the
defense of fair use and the operation of the idea/expression dichotomy; where
neither is available, copyright law may have to yield.31 Recently, in Golan v.
' Wiliams, 281 F. Supp. 2d at 1184.
3o See, e.g., Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 718 (1931) ("It has accordingly been decided by the
practice of the States, that it is better to leave a few of its noxious branches to their luxuriant
growth, than, by pruning them away, to injure the vigour of those yielding the proper fruits."); see
also New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (holding that an injunction prohibiting
the New York Times from printing portions of the "Pentagon Papers" constituted a prior restraint
on speech and thus an impermissible violation of the First Amendment); SunTrust Bank v.
Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001) (ruling from the bench before issuing an
opinion on fair use, that an injunction barring publication of The Wind Done Gone, which the trial
court had found to constitute "unabated piracy" of Gone Witb the Wind, was unconstitutional).
31 See, e.g., Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539,560 (1985); SunTrust
Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257,1263 (1 1th Cir. 2001) ("In copyright law, the balance
between the First Amendment and copyright is preserved, in part, by the idea/expression
dichotomy and the doctrine of fair use."); see also Eldred v. Ashcrofr, 537 U.S. 136, 221 (2003)
("[C]opyright's built-in free speech safeguards are generally adequate to address [First Amendment
concerns]. We recognize that the D.C. Circuit spoke too broadly when it declared copyrights
'categorically immune from challenges under the First Amendment.' But when, as in this case,
Congress has not altered the traditional contours of copyright protection, further First Amendment
scrutiny is unnecessary." (citation omitted)); Golan v. Gonzalez, 501 F.3d 1179, 1185-92 (10th
9
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GonZale, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that Congress's
enactment of copyright law was subject to First Amendment scrutiny where it
altered the traditional contours of copyright protection by potentially limiting use
of the public domain, as the court found that section 514 of the Uruguay Round
Agreements Act did when it restored copyright protection to public domain works
in furtherance of international treaty obligations." On remand, the District of
Colorado found that section 514 of the URAA violated the First Amendment.33
Moral rights enforcement is similarly subject to limitations by the First
Amendment. In WojnarowicZ v. American Family Ass'n, involving an artist's work
attributed to the artist in truncated form, the Southern District of New York
addressed a narrowly drawn New York "moral rights" statute that, like VARA,
applied only to fine art and only provided limited rights.' 4 The court recognized
a First Amendment distinction between the display of an altered work attributed
to the author of the original work and display of an altered work not attributed to
the author of the original work, noting that the former was "not the type of speech
or activity that demands protection, because such deception serves no socially
useful purpose" and therefore held that "[t]he First Amendment does not protect
the public display of altered artwork, falsely attributed to the original artist."3
However, the court held that:
The public display of an altered reproduction... in which there is
no express or reasonably implied attribution to the original artist is
altogether unlike the public attribution of an altered reproduction of
a work of art to its original artist. While the former is protected
speech, the latter is not.
36
Cir. 2007) (holding that the Copyright Term Extension Act was not unconstitutional, but that
section 514 of the Uruguay Round Agreement Act (URAA) was subject to First Amendment
scrutiny because restoring copyright protection to certain foreign works in the public domain
interfered with plaintiffs' First Amendment interests); Golan v. Holder, 611 F. Supp. 2d 1165 (D.
Colo. 2009) (determining that section 514 of the URAA Act did not survive First Amendment
scrutiny).
32 Golan v. Gonzalez, 501 F.3d 1179.
3 Holder, 611 F. Supp. 2d 1165 (D. Colo. 2009).
745 F. Supp. 130, 134 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). The statute at issue in Wojnarowicz provided in
relevant part:
No person other than the artist or a person acting with the artist's consent shall
knowingly display in a place accessible to the public or publish a work of fine
art... by that artist... in an altered, defaced, mutilated or modified form if the
work is displayed, published or reproduced as being the work of the artist...
and damage to the artist's reputation is reasonably likely to result therefrom ....
Id at 134-35.
" Id. at 140.
36 Id
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IV. MORAL RIGHTS AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT:
GOOGLE v. COPIEPRESSE
Google's "Google News" application aggregates on one website organized
access to news articles from internet news sources across the web. Through
automated "crawling," indexing, and proprietary technology that automatically
analyzes webpage content and clusters together related articles, Google News
provides users the ability to identify specific news stories with search terms and
to browse by topic a constantly-updated database of headlines and short excerpts
of news reports. It is not the news articles themselves that are made available on
Google News, but rather a headline, a "snippet" consisting of the first 300
characters of the story, and perhaps a low-resolution thumbnail image of a
photograph. The headline acts as a hot link, transferring the user to the internet
news source where the article is published and may be viewed in full.
In addition to claims of copyright infringement, Plaintiff Copiepresse, a
Belgian company managing the rights of Belgian, French, and German language
news publishers, claimed that the Google News application violated the authors'
moral rights of disclosure, attribution, and integrity.37 While the trial court denied
the right of disclosure claim, noting that Google News only indexes news articles
already published on the web, it found the attribution right violated because
Google News listed the internet news publisher's name, but not the individual
author's name.38 The right of integrity was also found to have been violated by
Google News's reproduction of only part of the authors' works and by the
clustering of different articles together by topic, in a manner that could cause
associations that might wrongfully alter the authors' intended editorial or
philosophical positions.
39
While the Belgian appellate court may choose to apply Belgian moral rights
law, rather than U.S. law,' it is doubtful that the plaintiff would be able to enforce
any foreign moral rights judgment in the United States due to fundamental
conflicts both with the U.S. Copyright Act and the First Amendment.
" Google v. Copiepresse, No. 06/10.928/C Tribunal de premiere instance de Bruxelles,
Feb. 13, 2007, available at http://www.copiepresse.be/13-02-07-jugement-en.pdf.
38 Id.
39 Id.
0 Mr. Beck's testimony in the case addressed only the proper application of U.S. law to the
Belgian moral rights claims at issue, not whether U.S. or Belgian law should govern those claims.
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A. COPIEPRESSE'S ATTRIBUTION AND INTEGRITY CLAIMS: CONFLICT WITH THE
U.S. CONSTITUTION AND COPYRIGHT ACT
The attribution claim asserted by the plaintiff in Copieesse likely would be
found to conflict impermissibly with U.S. law whether it was brought under the
federal Lanham Act or as a state or common law claim. Styled as a Lanham Act
§ 43(a)41 claim, it would usurp the superior position of U.S. Copyright Law under
the cases following Dastar, which have refused to enforce such claims except
"where the defendant literally repackages the plaintiff's goods and sells them as the
defendant's own."42  In Copiepresse, the plaintiff did not allege that Google
"repackaged" news articles as Google's own, but rather that Google modified
them without attribution. As such, the claim of failure to attribute fails the narrow
Lanham Act false attribution claim that survives Dastar, and would likely be found
to conflict impermissibly with the U.S. Copyright Act.
Similarly, under the reasoning in Dastar, allowing a state law attribution claim
like that asserted by the Belgian Copiepresse plaintiff would create a "mutant
copyright"--one extending the author's exclusive rights beyond those created by
Congress and providing neither a fair use nor an idea-expression defense. If the
right the plaintiff asserted in Copiepresse existed in the United States, a party such
as Google making a highly transformative, lawful fair use under copyright law43
would still be subject to moral rights liability if the original author's name was not
included. If Google attributed to the original authors the modified versions of
their works, however, Google would be subject to liability under the Lanham Act
claim for false attribution that survived the Supreme Court's holding in Dastar.
Allowing such a broad right of attribution claim under U.S. law would destroy the
carefully-crafted balance of public and private rights embodied by the Copyright
Act. Moreover, such a broad state or common law attribution right would also
conflict with the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution, which mandates that
state law inconsistent with federal law is of no force.'
41 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (providing cause of actions for false designations of origin; false
descriptions or representations).
42 Williams v. UMG Recording, Inc., 281 F. Supp. 2d 1177, 1184; see also supra note 28 and
accompanying text.
41 The transformative alteration of copyrighted work has been endorsed expressly by the U.S.
Supreme Court. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578-79 (1994); cf. SAIF,
T.G.I. Paris 3e ch., May 20, 2008 (finding Google Image Search's display of thumbnail images of
the complainants' works to be a fair use under U.S. law). The authors submitted the testimony of
five U.S. law school professors with expertise in copyright law in a parallel case in France to the
effect that Google's reproduction of snippets was transformative.
44 See U.S. CONST. art. VI, S 2 ("mhe Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law
of the Land.").
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Despite the Second Circuit's extension of relief for a moral rights-type integrity
claim in Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Co.,4 the integrity claim in Copipresse likely
would be found to conflict with U.S. law. To be sure, the continued viability of
the decision in Gilliam has been brought into question.' But if the pre-VARA
claim recognized in Gilliam were still enforceable today, it would not be broad
enough to encompass the facts of the integrity claim asserted in Copiepresse. In
Gilliam, plaintiffs were named as the authors of the truncated version of their
work, effectively constituting a misrepresentation under U.S. law.47 In Copiepresse,
however, Google News does not include the name of the individual authors of the
articles; in fact, this omission is the basis of plaintiff's right of attribution claim.
Moreover, the Supreme Court's reasoning in Dastar should apply with equal force
to an integrity claim of the type brought in Copiepresse, as recognizing such a claim
would similarly create a "mutant copyright" that would extend the author's
exclusive rights beyond those provided for in the Copyright Act, and would create
liability for uses by the public specifically endorsed by the U.S. Supreme Court,
such as transformative uses.
B. COPIEPRESSE'S ATTRIBUTION AND INTEGRITY CLAIMS: CONFLICT WITH THE
FIRST AMENDMENT
In addition to the preemption issues discussed above, there are also strong
arguments that moral rights claims of the type asserted by the plaintiff in
Copiepresse would impermissibly alter the traditional contours of copyright
protection in a manner that would chill free speech in violation of the First
Amendment.4
1. The Right oflntegri ty. The civil law right of integrity claim asserted by the
plaintiff in Google v. Copiepresse neither preserves the built-in First Amendment
safeguards nor replaces them with safeguards of its own. Application of the
factors applied by U.S. courts in conducting fair use analyses shows that uses
45 538 F.2d 14 (1976).
' See supra note 24 and accompanying text; see also United States v. Microsoft Corp., No. Civ.
A. 98-1232, 1998 WL 614485, at *16 (D.D.C. 1998) ("But the Gilkam court acknowledged the lack
of statutory or doctrinal support in copyright law for the right it recognized and ultimately grounded
its decision in trademark law. Several subsequent decisions considering Gilkam have declined to
endorse the 'moral right' argument Microsoft advances." (internal citations omitted)).
41 Gil'am, 538 F.2d at 24.
" Under analogy to the rule in Golan v. GonZales, 501 F.3d 1179, 1184 (10th Cir. 2007), derived
from the Supreme Court's opinion in Eldredv. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186,221 (2003), moral rights claims
that would alter the traditional contours of protection under the U.S. copyright law by expanding
the author's exclusive rights in a manner that would impair freedom of expression would have to
withstand First Amendment scrutiny.
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permitted as fair use under traditional U.S. copyright law would be prevented by
Copiepresse's integrity claims.49 The very type of transformative use which the
doctrine of fair use allows in order to provide adequate "breathing room" for the
First Amendment would be punished by enforcement of Copiepresse's integrity
claims. The second fair use factor allows greater use of nonfiction, utilitarian
expression than of more highly creative works, but the integrity claims brought by
Copiepresse-based on the use of news articles--clearly do not distinguish
between creative and nonfiction works. As for the third fair use factor, the less
a defendant copies from the original work, the more likely the third factor will
weigh in favor of fair use. By contrast, under a right of integrity analysis, the less
a defendant copies, the more the defendant has "truncated" or "mutilated" the
work. Finally, the fourth factor would be irrelevant to a right of integrity analysis
because whether or not the defendant's use affected the copyright owner's
potential market for a particular use does not carry weight in an assessment of the
reputational harm that moral, rights seek to remedy.
Similarly, the First Amendment safety valve of the idea-expression dichotomy
50
would provide no defense against an integrity claim such as the one brought
against Google in Copiepresse. Even extensively revising an author's original work
so that only uncopyrightable ideas and facts are used would not immunize a party
from an integrity claim for mutilation of the original work.
2. The Right of Attribution. Similarly, Copiepresse's civil law moral right of
attribution claims would likely be found unenforceable in the United States as
running afoul of the core constitutional values embodied in the First Amendment.
In Copiepresse, Google's use was of an excerpt of the authors' news articles, not
attributed to the individuals who penned them. While the court in WiojnarowicZ
noted that the display of an altered work falsely attributed to the original work's
author was not speech protected by the First Amendment, the court recognized
that the alteration or mutilation of a work without express or implied attribution
to the original artist "is protected speech."'', Therefore, enforcement in the United
States of an attribution claim like Copiepresse's would threaten to punish speech
protected by the First Amendment. In sum, allowing enforcement of such
integrity and attribution claims would impermissibly chill protected speech in
violation of core constitutional values under the First Amendment. Authors
wishing to make use of another's work would face a Hobson's choice:
49 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006) (listing the fair use factors: "(1) the purpose and character of the
use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used...;
and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work").
50 See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
51 745 F. Supp. 130, 140 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
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reproducing with attribution the unaltered original work in its entirety, thereby
subjecting themselves to copyright liability, or reproducing an excerpt or otherwise
altered version of the original, thereby subjecting themselves to moral right of
integrity claims (as well as attribution claims if the author's name were omitted and
a possible Lanham Act § 43(a) claim if the author's name were included).,2
V. CONCLUSION
Copiepresse's moral rights claims (typical of claims which exist in a number of
European Union countries) conflict with core fundamental U.S. laws and the U.S.
Constitution. The idea-expression dichotomy and fair use doctrines are critical to
the U.S. Copyright Act's coexistence with the First Amendment, itself one of the
most foundational principles of U.S. law. Because of the significance of the
conflict that would be created (including the inapplicability of a fair use defense
and the idea-expression dichotomy to an integrity claim), it is likely that
constitutional principles and public policy considerations would weigh strongly
against enforcement in the U.S. of civil law rights of attribution and integrity of
the nature asserted by the plaintiff in the Belgian Copiepresse case.
52 While a divided court in Giliam v. American Broadcasling Co. narrowly upheld a moral tights-
type integrity claim under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act, where the defendant attributed to the
plaintiffs a truncated version the plaintiffs' work, as discussed supra Part II.B.3, the Copiepresse case
involved no false attribution. Rather, Google News's use in Copiepresse was exactly the type of use
protected in Wojnarowuir a "public display of an altered reproduction . .. in which there is no
express or reasonably implied attribution to the original artist." Wojnarowi, 745 F. Supp. at 140.
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